part of developed world were crushed by internal
instability and its state of economy, it finally
turned to its southern neighbors in order to
address such pragmatic issues as 7.000 km of
common border with Kazakhstan and emerging
concerns about potential Islamization of Russian
Muslims (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012). However,
during the process of developing foreign policy
towards CA, Russia came to more or less same
understanding about CA as any other major actors
had – there are no options in approaching CA
except for bilateralism (Laruelle & Peyrouse,
2012). Still, not wanting to lag behind the US with
its Silk Way visions of CA, Russia and China
came up with their own ideas about “regional
integration” expressed in “pro-Russian” Col-
lective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and
“pro-Chinese” Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (SCO) (Cooley, 2012). The main rationale for
existence of both organizations is to demonstrate
the US that CA will go any way of political
development except for the “Western” one. This
image of solidarity is occasionally disturbed by
Islam Karimov who spoils spirit of indivisible
tripartite Russian-Chinese-CA camaraderie by his
already traditional dissident gyrations towards the
US DoD offers (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012).
Kyrgyzstan, in comparison, is much more
trustworthy in showing its unwavering loyalties to
Russia (but not when the US doubles the price).
Thus, the early 2000s situational context in which
many analysts such as Legvold, Sultanov and
Muzaparova used to analyze CA importance for
external world was dominated by concepts such as
CA as historical link between the East and West,
the “New Great Game” and CA as a “core” of
long-term economic, geopolitical and security
interests of “Great Powers”.
A New “Great Game”: plans and reality
Alexander Cooley (2012) in his latest book
The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia
mentions leaked diplomatic cables from the US
mission in Tashkent where US employees
constantly bemoaned quality of CA infrastructure
and transportation that made them re-schedule
their plans. Such minor entirely non-great details
like unreliable railroads or shortages of electricity
are major reasons why any “Great Game” in CA
in XXI c. is doomed to exist largely in fictional
plane somewhere along the Great Silk Way. How
to play “great games” in the land where all
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infrastructure must be torn down and rebuilt
anew to fit modern day requirements and be
complementary to modern technology, and with
whom to play them if overwhelming part of
government bureaucracy and military personnel in
CA operate and do their work in conceptually
different terms than their colleagues in the West
(Cooley, 2012). Moreover, it seems to many
scholars that – surprise, surprise – local elites are
not actually interested in the long-term
development of their states. Certainly, the EU can
bring specially-trained drug-sniffing dogs to assist
the US counterdrug initiatives in CA, but who is
supposed to stop border personnel in CA from
immediately selling these highly-valued dogs to
local nouveau riche for breeding (Cooley, 2012).
The US can provide special military training in
terms of fighting organized crime and drug traffic
to Uzbekistani military, but then both Pentagon
and State Department will have to eternally keep
awkward silence on questions about domestic uses
of these specially trained forces by Uzbekistani
leader (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012). This
increasingly ashamed approach of the West to its
ongoing partnership with Central Asia was best
expressed in the self-humiliating announcement of
the British council in Uzbekistan after Andijan
events that the US intelligence services used
extensive experience of Uzbek’s special services
to interrogate terrorist suspects in infamous
shadow CIA facilities in Uzbekistan (Fumagalli,
2010). The point of Cooley and many other
Western analysts is not to argue against obvious
strategic importance of CA in the post-9/11
strategy of the US, but to recognize that for the
US there might be nothing “great” or “historically
significant” in their need-driven cooperation with
CA (Cooley, 2012). Same as the US actions
during the Cold War period, CA is not an issue
that State Department or Pentagon officials would
like to discuss or have debates about in future.
Additionally, most of the foreign policy of the US
has already pivoted eastward towards the most
dynamic and quickly developing regions in the
XXI c. – East Asia and Asia-Pacific, the real
potential location of “great games” among world
powers in modern times (Laruelle & Peyrouse,
2012).
In regards to CA perspective, as Alexander
Cooley writes in his introduction it would be self-
deceiving to imagine global politics in CA as a
new version of XIX c. power struggle between
major powers for dominating territories of some
weak state formations. First of all, complex and
constantly changing interactions among US,
Russian and China in Central Asia are often far
from being “competition” and so rarely take forms
of compromises and cooperation (Laruelle &
Peyrouse, 2012). Secondly, CA states and
Kazakhstan are not exactly “victims” as the title
of “Great Game” pre-supposes, moreover, CA
leaders have become quite skilled in using short-
term needs of major external actors for their own
benefits (Cooley, 2012). A broad range of external
experts and institutions agree that main threats for
CA security and integrity come not from external
threats but from three completely non-military
issues – lack of capable governing institutions,
deteriorating infrastructure and lack of compe-
titive human capital. In comparison with, for
example, terrorist attacks, these issues are less
visible and require longer time to develop at the
full scale, but when they do, the extend of their
damage is much more encompassing than the
most radical Islamic terrorist group could have
ever accomplished (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012).
Paradoxically, concerns with issues like the US
“neo-imperialism”, color revolutions in post-
Soviet space and preservation of the Holy Grail of
the whole post-USSR world – state’s sovereignty
from the US and China – have left almost no
space in public discourse for discussions of such
as, for example, declining human resources, fai-
lures of national modernization projects, increasing
rent-seeking nature of economies, huge regional
inequalities and social injustices.
In summary, CA importance in terms of stra-
tegic security, of course, would keep and maybe
even escalate depending on the US-labeled
“AfPak” situation in the region, but as a subject of
genuine interest for external actors’ ambitions and
investments it will continue to be restricted by its
status of world’s “periphery” (and exporter of
hydrocarbons) as it was bluntly described by
Laruelle and Peyrouse. Kazakhstan is considered
to have the most chances (and resources) to make
a giant effort and use oil revenues to finally
produce something resembling true modernization
and construction of its infrastructure, possibly
really becoming some version of “Eurasian hub”
(Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012). However, majority
is still very skeptical towards real possibility of
such outcome due to many structural restraints
and lack of genuine political will on all levels in
Kazakhstan. First of all, in order to achieve it,
Kazakhstani ruling elite would have spon-
taneously to “realize” the problem of fading
human capital, damaging nature of rent-seeking
economy and economic losses from widespread
corruption (Laruelle & Peyrouse, 2012).
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Moreover, they would have to go further and
perform even more complex calculations in order
not to bluntly call for any industrialization as it
was done during the Soviet period, but as Laruelle
and Peyrouse point out to take into account
influence of geographical position and compe-
tition from China before choosing final type of
economic model that might, in the end, focus on
building service economy. Secondly, as almost all
experts point out while Kazakhstan might be very
different from other CA states, its security and
prosperity still depends much on its less fortunate
neighbors in terms of regional infrastructure,
markets, electricity, water, labor migration,
influence of Islam, etc. (Fumagalli, 2010). There
is no way around the pressuring need to have
some real forms of regional integration which are
not summits and cultural events but, first of all,
recognition of some essential collective interests
that overweigh individual benefits for each state,
creation of consistent long-term strategies and
establishment of working institutions that would
exercise them. But as Matteo Fumagalli (2010)
points out such form of thinking is very unlikely
to develop in CA in any foreseeable future.
Who is who in the region?
China is increasing its economic presence and
is seen as a source of loans for large-scale
infrastructure projects. United States have become
an important source of income for a number of
Central Asian countries, as America pays the rent
for the use of military bases. To a lesser extent,
through programs of economic and cultural
cooperation between its increasing roles in the
region, there are also India, Iran, Pakistan and
Turkey. Despite this abundance of countries
interested in cooperation, past experience and
common heritage as before make Russia a major
target for the management of Central Asia,
especially in the area of security. Yet such a
decision should be regarded as more pragmatic
than related to ideological considerations. The
elites in the countries of Central Asia is often see
in Russia a viable and reliable sponsor of their
own regimes and security guarantees and
economic assistance necessary for the existence of
their states. At the same time, they see Russia as a
country to which they shouldn’t be too much
dependent, because Russia will use the situation to
control their internal politics of self-interest. Thus,
the countries of Central Asia, often in their own
interest use Russia and other foreign players in
expanding influence in the region, pushing
Moscow towards other influential states. In other
words, while Russia is a very important player in
Central Asia, the countries of the region do not
experience anxiety or even difficulty in playing
the balance of interests of Moscow and other
powers. And really, when it is considered that in
the Central Asia there are two largest economies
in addition to Russia's, the countries of the region
to some extent act as a consumers and can claim
for themselves the concessions and discounts from
each of them.
Speaking of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, a remarkable fact in this context is
Moscow's desire to establish a general framework
of the CIS Security Council that can later turn into
over-governmental body to coordinate efforts to
prevent changes in the form of so-called velvet
revolution. In addition, Central Asia means a lot
to Russia as a source of threats to its security. It is
believed that the current insurgency in the region
and extremist groups linked to militant organiza-
tions in the North Caucasus, which were unsolvable
problem for the internal security of Russia. In
addition, Central Asia is the main transit route for
illegal drug shipments to Russia and on to Europe.
The objectives of Russia in Central Asia are
associated with a variety of broader foreign policy
objectives. In addition to the real benefits of
cooperation within the CSTO, EurAsEC and the
CES, the promotion of Russia mechanisms and
organizations is an important part of its strategy
according to the status of the main and
predominant actor in "their" region, and the title
of "great power" on a global scale, as Moscow has
played a leading role in the post-Soviet
integration. Speaking of the SCO, China is
superior to Russia of its economic power, forcing
her out of the region. However, in terms of the
security Russia and those multilateral asso-
ciations, which she heads, are still more important
and significant. Many believe that the partici-
pation of Moscow and Beijing in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization is an unwritten
agreement, according to which Beijing does not
challenge the predominant role of Russia in
security matters, and Moscow does not object to
strengthen the economic position of China in
Central Asia. An important element here is the
insistence of Moscow to maintain the Collective
Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian
Economic Community, together with the SCO as
an organization under Russian influence, although
to some extent they duplicate the functions of the
SCO. From the point of view of the Kremlin,
these parallel structures guarantee the preservation
of Moscow's position as the main sponsor of some
Central Asian countries in matters of security.
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Speaking of GCAP, the initiative has been
supported by the US State Department, and has
considerable effects on Central and Southern Asia
policy of the US. The majority of these concerns
have been directly related with “poverty”, which
is the apparent fact of the region. Despite the
progress after the remove of Taliban regime,
Afghanistan remains extremely poor, and highly
dependent on foreign aid. The primary step to be
taken for the permanent stability in Central Asian
countries is to solve the poverty problem. No
advancement seems to be achieved in the near
future unless current authoritarian regimes and the
Moscow-dependent economic systems are rep-
laced. There are various considerable projects
initiated by UN, EU, Asia Development Bank and
Japan about this issue, and GCAP is among these
projects.
The geopolitical importance of Central Asia
increased after the 9/11 attacks and America’s
military operation in Afghanistan to demolish
Taliban regime. Similarly, the importance of
Central Asia region for American foreign policy
increased even more. The US, which was trying to
approach the region through economy and energy,
began to surround the region with politic and
military means. As it is believed in context of GCAP
region wide trade would enable Afghan farmers to
get their legal produce to world markets, create
jobs, and provide revenue to the central govern-
ment; for other Central Asian countries, it would
lead to expanded relations with countries to the
south, providing g an alternative to Russia’s mo-
nopoly over their export of hydrocarbons, electri-
city, and cotton, and expanded relations with
China. One of the functions of the GCAP would
be a tool for more effectively delivering and coor-
dinating aid and assistance programs.
Murat Laumilin, who describes the GCAP as
the new “Mega Project” of the US, claimed that
the main aim of the project was to avoid the
region turning to sphere of influence of Russia
and China. According to Laumilin, if the project
was realized, Central Asia would be separated
from its integral part of Eurasia and it would be
removed from Russia and CIS. On the other hand,
some US specialists are thinking that US policy
would only have a marginal effect of minimizing
Russian or Chinese presence in the region. The
SCO is gaining in geopolitical throw-weight quite
substantially. So this initiative could be seen as a
geopolitical “counterweight” to SCO. Through
this project, the US is pushing to open up trade
and relations between Central and South Asia,
particularly in the energy sector. GCAP could be
also seen as the US response to Russia’s and
China’s growing influence in Central Asia.
Speaking of CAU, in order to establish a union
between the states, their level of socioeconomic
development and potential should be comparable.
Such reasoning is quite rational as the five states
of the region have very different political,
economic and social prerequisites. For instance,
the Central Asian states have adopted strikingly
different approaches to economic development,
with Kyrgyzstan embarking on the most ambitious
economic liberalization reforms in the region and
Turkmenistan proclaiming neutrality and isolatio-
nism. Of no less importance is the unequal
distribution of the natural resources of the region
that constitute a significant portion of Central
Asia’s export commodities. It should be kept in
mind, however, that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are members of regio-
nal organizations such as the Eurasian Economic
Community and the Shanghai Cooperation Orga-
nization. The former includes Russia and Belarus,
the latter Russia and China. Thus, an institutional
framework of regional cooperation does, in effect,
exist. However, the incentive for joining these
organizations may not be to seek closer coope-
ration among the states of Central Asia, but rather
at establishing better relations with their larger
neighbors – Russia and China.
Conclusion
The future restoration of Central Asia's links
with India and Pakistan, which were also ruptured
through war in Afghanistan, opens up the
possibility of access to Pakistani and Indian ports
as well as markets for Central Asian goods. Given
Moscow's ongoing interest in reviving the North-
South freight transportation corridor, Russia can
play a particularly important role in developing
infrastructure and bringing the landlocked Central
Asian countries into the global marketplace. Here,
the United States could also play a role by
encouraging and assisting Russia in the devel-
opment of this route as a complement to the East-
West transportation routes from Central Asia
across the Caspian, to the Caucasus and the Black
Sea, promoted by the U.S in the 1990s. While the
East-West route became a focus of early compe-
tition between America and Russia, the develop-
ment of a North-South route that binds Central
Asia to Europe and Asia could just as easily
become a vehicle for cooperation. Without coope-
ration between the U.S. and Russia, the prospects
for stability in Central Asia are fairly slim. A
renewal of competition will undermine both coun-
tries efforts to ensure their security in the region.
Gulnara Dadabayeva, D.Sc.
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Bulletin KazNU. History series. № 3(70). 2013
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International Actors. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, pp. 177-190.
Laruelle, M., & Peyrouse, S. (2012). Globalizing CA: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development. New York:
M.E. Sharpe , Inc.
Legvold, R. (2003). U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan. In Legvold, Robert (Ed.), Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers,
Kazakhstan, and the CAn Nexus. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp.67-106.
Sultanov, B., & Muzaparova, L. (2003). Great Power Policies and Interests in Kazakhstan. In Legvold, Robert (Ed.), Thinking
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УДК 930.1
Аррахман Хуру оглу Ахмедов
Азербайджанский Педагогический Университет,
Доцент кафедры «Общая история», доктор философии по истории, Азербайджан, г. Баку
Азербайджан-Казахстан: из истории возникновения
политических отношений (90-е гг. ХХ века)
В статье нашли свое отражение конкретные и фактические материалы о создании и развитии отношений
между Азербайджаном и Казахстаном после восстановления независимости. После распада Советского
Союза наряду с Азербайджаном и другие постсоветские, тюркоязычные страны, обладающие большим
экономическим и человеческим потенциалом и вошедшие в мировое единство как независимые и равно-
правные государства, начали сотрудничать с другими странами.
В результате исследования вышеуказанных документов, автор приходит к выводу, что после восста-
новления независимости, по сравнению с другими постсоветскими тюркоязычными государствами, отно-
шения Азербайджана с Казахстаном были более беспроблемными и стабильными. Систематические встречи
официальных лиц Азербайджанской Республики и Республики Казахстан послужили созданию искренних
отношений и углублению в результате подписания двусторонних договоров политических, экономических,
культурных взаимоотношений.
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